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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
principal case cited several New York cases 28 in defense, relying upon
the interpretation given the term "accident" in New York.
At the present time approximately one-third of the states allow recovery
under the common law only if the accident does not come under one of the
categories provided for in the Workmens Compensation Act 20 since the Act
is compulsory as to the specifically enunciated injuries.
The statutes of North Dakota require every employer engaged in a
hazardous enterprise to be covered by the Workmens Compensation Act 30
and no employer so covered is liable in tort for any injuries suffered by his
employees. This pertains to those employers engaged in non-hazardous work
also if they comply with the provisions of the Act.3' While there are no
cases directly in point with the principal case in this state it seems likely that
the North Dakota court would follow Missouri in circumventing any limitations
placed on the term "accident." In a 1941 case 32 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota stated that the term "immediately" as used in a liability policy
did not mean "instantaneously." However, the court refused to further define
the term at that time.
HAnOLD C. LUCKING
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - INJURIES FOR WHICH COMPENSATION MAY
BE HAD - ACTS OF A RECREATIONAL CHARACTER SPONSORED BY EMPLOYER. -
Claimant, a member of the General Electric Athletic Association, a member-
ship corporation open only to employees of the General Electric Company; sus-
tained a fracture of the left ankle during a game held on company property.
Held, claimant was entitled to an award of Workmen's Compensation since
the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Tedesco v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 305 N.Y. 544, 114 N.E.2d 33 (1953).
The dismissal of the claim by the Appellate Division was based mainly
on the precedent of Matter of Wilson v. General Motors Corp., An examination
of the facts of that case makes it obvious that it has no sound application to
the instant case. In the case of Wilson v. General Motors the, employees of a
plant had organized a softball league, conducting games after hours and off
the premises for their own recreation and without any business advantages
to the employer. Though the employer did permit conferences relating to
28. Jacobson v. Employers Assurance Corp., 259 N.Y. 559, 182 N.E. 180 (1932);
Lerner v. Rump Bros., 241 N.Y. 153, 149 N.E. 334 (1925); Jefferys v. Charles H. Sager
Co., 233 N.Y. 535, 135 N.E. 907 (1922).
29. 1 Larson, Workmens Compensation Law, 167.10 (1st Ed. 1952).
30. "Employers who comply with the provisions of this chapter shall not be liable to
respond in damages at common law or by statute for injury to or death of any employee,
wherever occurring, during the period covered by the premiums paid into the fund."
N.D.Rev. Code, 065-0428 (1943).
31. "Any employer carrying on any employment not classed as hazardous under the
definition of that term contained in section 65-0102 who complies with the provisions of
this title and who shall pay into the fund the premiums provided for under this chapter
shall not he liable to respond in damages at common law . . . for injuries to or the death
of any employe. . . . during the period covered by such premiums, if the injured employee
has remaincd in the service of such employer with notice that the employer has paid into
the fund the premiums provided for under the provisions of this title. The continuation
in the service of such employer with such notice shall constitute a waiver by the employee
of his right of action as aforesaid." N.D.Rev. Code, §65-0429 (1943).
32. Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n., 70 N.D. 566, 296 N.W.
545 (1941) (the statement, "The insurer shall be liable only for such accidental iniuries
as shall immediately . . . disable the insured." appeared in the policy).
1. 298 N.Y. 468. 48 N.E.2d 781 (1949).
I'C :l'1N CASES
games to be held on company property during working hours it was held
that this injury was not conipensable since the possible hmc.fit that tile em-
ployer received from the resulting esprit de corps was, to use the language of
the court, "too tenuous and ephemeral".-' It was further stated by the court in
Wilson v. General Motors, "Personal activities of employees, unrelated to the
employment, remote from the place of work and its risk, not compelled or
controlled by the employer, yielding it neither advantage nor bencfit, are not
within the compass of the Workmen's Compensation Law. '"
Possibly because of the comparatively recent advent of athletic associa-
tions among employees there are as yet no definite and settled principles by
which to solve this type of case.
In "horse-play" cases courts are prone to allow recovery when the act
causing the injury has become so customary as to be incidental to the em-
ployment and the employer knew or should have known about the practice of
his employees but took no steps to stop it. 4 In these cases the courts have
also shown great reluctance to compensate an employee whose "practical"
jokes have resulted in his own injury. 5
The cardinal point of many Workmen's Compensation cases is whether
the injury arose out of, and in the course of, employment.,
"Out of employment" and "in the course of employment" are by no means
synonymous terms. The phrase "out of" refers to origin or cause.7 "In the
course of" is indicative of time, place and circumstances.8 Consequently it
is not every injury that is compensable under Workmen's Compensation mere-
ly because the claimant sustained it during the time of his employment. For
an injury to arise out of and in the course of employment the accident com-
plained of must result from a risk peculiar to the occupation with a casual
connection between employment and injury.
2. Wilson v. General Motors Corp., 298 N.Y. 468, 473, 84 N.E.2d 781, 784 (1949).
3. Ibid.
4. Mascika v. Connecticut Tool & Engineering Co., 109 Conn. 473, 147 AtI. 11
(1929) (stick throwing by boys before working hours which employer knew about and
failed to stop); Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 104 Kan. 432, 179 Pac. 372
(1919) (minor girl injured while riding truck (luring lunch time, a habit which employer
knew of); Glenn v. Reynolds Spring Co., 225 Mich. 693, 196 N.W. 617 (1924)
(customary joke of connecting electric wires to tools resulted in death of an employee);
accord, Budrevie v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 24 N.J. Misc. 24, 45 A.2d 453 (1946),
cert. denied, 135 N.J.L. 46, 50 A.2d 147 (1946), aff'd, 136 N.J.L. 46, 55 A.2d 10 (1946)
(recovery denied where employee was pushed from elevator in jest but there was no
contention that such acts were customary).
5. Hughes v. Tapley, 206 Ark. 739, 177 S.W.2d 429 (1944) (attempt to scare
fellow employee with powder charge); Givens v. Travelers Insurance Co., 71 Ga. App.
50, 30 S.E.2d 115 (1944); Horn v. Broadway Garage, 186 Old. 535, 99 P.2d 150
(1940) (claimants attempt to shoot steel clip with rubber band backfired).
6. E.g., Antoszkiewicz v. Industrial Commission, 382 Ill. 149, 47 N.E.2d 74 (1943)
(circumstantial evidence indicated that janitor who fell down stairs was killed in the
course of his employment); Figgins v. Industrial Commission, 379 11. 75, 39 N.E.2d
353 (1942) (recovery allowed where claimant was injured by agricultural machine while
trying to dodge a gypsy fortune teller).
7. Irwin-Neisler & Co. v. Industrial Commission, 346 Ill. 89, 178 N.E. 358 (1931)
(chemist injured in automobile accident while distributing samples during vacation);
Borgeson v. Industrial Commission, 368 111. 188, 13 N.E.2d 164 (1938) (salesman entering
building to make salt- was killed by a stray bullet intended for another) (compensation
dc.ed).
8. Walke'r v. lydc, 4:1 Idaho 625, 253 Pac. 1105 (1927) (lumberman killed by
frock he intended to board when returning from lunch); Stark v. State Industrial Accident
Conmission, 103 Ore. 80, 204 Pac. 151 (1922).
9. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Kruzic, 91 Colo. 398. 30 P.2d 868 (1934)
(c-lainoant shot by fellow employee outside of working hours); Borgeson v. Industrial
Commission, 368 111. 188, 13 N.E.2d 164 (19:38).
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Although, as stated previously, there are no settled principles by which
to solve the sporting and recreation controversies, a few guides have e:merged
from the cases that have thus far been considered by the courts. In gc.neral
the courts will take cognizance of the following factors: One, the advertising
benefit the employer gets from sponsorship of the activity.'0 Two, cmipillsiul,
used by the employer to force the employee to participate in the activity.''
Three, supervision of the activity by the employer.' Four, other bent'lits
gained by the employer through employee participation in the activity.'
In the instant case the evideucv pointed to a great deal of employer von-
trol over the association. The eniployer appointed one member of the board
of directors and in one instance the association was inactive throtughout a
strike that affected the company by order of an officer of General EIctric.
There was no direct compulsion used to force employees to participate but
the company encousraged such participation to the extent of using its own
personnel facilities in handling applications for membership in the employee
association. Further supervision might be assumed from the fact that the
association was subsidized financially by General Electric.
There is a definite trend toward liberality of interpretation in Workmen's Com-
pensation cases.14 Courts have awarded compensation for injuries which might
not, by lay standards, be considered compensable.' Taking the foregoing
factors into consideration the decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant
case appears to he in accord with other decisions to the point. The courts
should look for more than secondary benefits to employer such as esprit de
corps. To allow recovery in every athletic case on the ground that the activity
engaged in benefits the employer by fostering good will among the employees
would carry the law to questionable lengths and open the door to many far-
fetched claims.
EDwIN A. GAJESKI
10. Ott v. Industrial Commission. 83 Ohio App. 13, 82 N.E.2d 137 (1948) (claimant
suffered heart attack while playing baseball. But see, Le Bar v. Ewald Brothers Dairy,
217 Minn. 16, 13 N.W.2d 729 (1944) (the court discussed the advertising factor but did not
consider it essential to the case); Hoist v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App. Div. 233,
299 N.Y.S. 25.5 (1937) (court stated that it was not required to consider the advertising
factor).
11. Hubber v. Eagle Stationary Corp.. 254 App. Div. 788, 4 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1938)
(claimant was instructed by employer to form and supervise baseball team); Salt Lake
City v. Industrial Commission. 104 Utah 436. 140 P.2d 644 (1943) (fireman required
to play handball to keep in shape); cf. Stakonis v. United Advertising Corp., 110 Conn.
384, 148 Atli. 334 (1930) (employees received regular wages only if they attended picnic).
12. Piusinski v. Transit Valley Country Club, 283 N.Y. 674, 28 N.E.2d 4110. (1940)
(caddy injured while engaged in practice game which caddies were encouraged to play
under supervision of caddy-master); Huhber v. Eagle Stationary Corp., 254 App. Div.
788, 4 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1938); Hoist v. New York Stock Exchange, 252 App. Div. 233,
299 N.Y.S. 255 (1937); Ott v. Industrial Commission. 83 Ohio App. 13. 82 N.E.2d 137
(1948). But cf. Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245
(1948) (requiring supervision amounting to compulsion).
13. See note 12, 8upra.
14. Shockley v. King, 31 Del. 606. 117 AtI. 280 (1922) (part-time employees
counted to bring total within statutory minimum); Cole v. Minnick, 123 Neb. 871, 244
N.W. 785 (1932) (issue was whether claimant was employee or independent contractor).
Contra: O'Brien v. Wise & Upson Co., 108 Conn. 157, 143 Atl. 155 (1928) (compensation
statute not to be construed in favor of either party).
15. Giracelli v. Franklin Cleaners and Dyers, 132 N.J.L. .590. 42 A.2d 3 (1945)
(rape of salesgirl left alone in building); Lippman v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 55 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 1952) (waitress shut by customer of another
waitress with no motive shown).
